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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CASE NO: SACV 08-688 JVS (SHx)

TERESITA G. COSTELO, *et al* ,  
Plaintiff(s),

ORDER RE  
MOTION TO CERTIFY CLASS

v.

MICHAEL CHERTOFF, *et al*,  
Defendant(s).

Plaintiffs Teresita G. Costelo (“Costelo”) and Lorenzo P. Ong (“Ong”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) seek certification of a class for injunctive and declaratory relief against Defendants Michael Chertoff, *et al.* (collectively, “Defendants”). Defendants oppose. The motion is GRANTED, as set forth below.

I. Background

Plaintiffs’ requested relief involves the interpretation of a provision of the

1 Child Status Protection Act (“CSPA”), codified at § 203(h)(3) of the Immigration  
2 and National Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(h)(3) (hereinafter “§ 203(h)(3)”).

3  
4 Plaintiffs previously moved for class certification in July 2008 (Docket No.  
5 4), which was denied without prejudice on the grounds that the Court “would  
6 benefit greatly from any interpretation of § 203(h)(3) which the BIA [Board of  
7 Immigrant Appeals] might issue” in two similar cases pending before the BIA  
8 (Docket No. 32, at 1). As a result, the case was “stayed in its entirety for 180 days  
9 to afford the BIA an opportunity to issue an interpretation of § 203(h)(3) in the  
10 first instance.” (*Id.* at 2.) Prior to the June 15, 2009 hearing on this motion, the  
11 BIA had issued no such interpretation and the stay had expired. Then, the day after  
12 the hearing, the BIA decided Matter of Wang, 25 I. & N. Dec. 28 (B.I.A. June 16,  
13 2009), as set forth below.<sup>1</sup>

14 Presently before the Court is Plaintiffs’ second motion for class certification.

15  
16 II. Legal Standard

17  
18 A motion for class certification involves a two-part analysis. First, Plaintiffs  
19 must demonstrate that the proposed class satisfies the requirements of Rule 23(a):  
20 (1) the members of the proposed class must be so numerous that joinder of all  
21 claims would be impracticable; (2) there must be questions of law and fact  
22 common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties must  
23 be typical of the claims or defenses of absent class members; and (4) the  
24

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25 <sup>1</sup> While the parties dispute whether Wang was properly decided, and whether it is a  
26 reasonable opinion subject to Chevron deference, there is no dispute that it addressed nearly the  
27 same issue presented here. (Supp’l Mot. Br. 1; Supp’l Opp’n Br. 1-2; see also Amicus Br. 1-3.)

1 representative parties must fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.  
2 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).

3  
4 Second, Plaintiffs must meet the requirements of at least one of the  
5 subsections of Rule 23(b). Here, Plaintiffs contend that the class qualifies under  
6 Rule 23(b)(2), for which a class may be maintained where “the party opposing the  
7 class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that  
8 final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting  
9 the class as a whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).

10  
11 The party seeking certification must provide facts sufficient to satisfy the  
12 requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b). Doninger v. Pac. Nw. Bell, Inc., 564 F.2d  
13 1304, 1308-09 (9th Cir. 1977). In turn, the district court must conduct a rigorous  
14 analysis to determine whether the prerequisites of Rule 23 have been met. Gen.  
15 Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982). While the Court’s analysis must be  
16 rigorous, Rule 23 confers “broad discretion to determine whether a class should be  
17 certified, and to revisit that certification throughout the legal proceedings before  
18 the court.” Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849, 872, n.28 (9th Cir. 2001).

19 In Falcon, the Supreme Court reiterated the well-recognized precept that  
20 “the class determination generally involves considerations that are enmeshed in  
21 the factual and legal issues comprising the plaintiff’s cause of action.” Falcon,  
22 457 U.S. at 160 (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469  
23 (1978)). Nevertheless, there is “nothing in either the language or history of Rule  
24 23 that gives a court any authority to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits  
25 of a suit in order to determine whether it may be maintained as a class action.”  
26 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974).

1 III. Discussion

2  
3 According to Plaintiffs, the “issue before this Court is whether the  
4 government can ignore the requirements of [] § 203(h)(3) and refuse to adjudicate  
5 applications for lawful permanent residence under the correct (original) priority  
6 date.” (Mot. Br. 16.) More precisely, as set forth below, the issue is whether the  
7 automatic conversion and date retention provisions of § 203(h)(3) apply to aliens  
8 who age out of eligibility for an immigrant visa as the derivative beneficiary of a  
9 third- or fourth-preference visa petition, and on whose behalf a second-preference  
10 petition is later filed by a different petitioner.<sup>2</sup> An understanding of this issue  
11 requires some context.

12  
13 Over a decade ago, “an enormous backlog of adjustment of status (to  
14 permanent residence) applications . . . developed at the INS.” H.R. Rep. No.  
15 107-45, at \*2 (2001), as reprinted in 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. 640, 641. As a result,  
16 child beneficiaries of visa applications often would “age-out,” or turn twenty-one,  
17 before the application was processed, thereby requiring the applicant to shift into a  
18 lower preference category and be placed “at the end of a long waiting list for a  
19 visa.”<sup>3</sup> Id. The CSPA was enacted on August 6, 2002 “essentially . . . to provide  
20 relief to children who might ‘age out’ of their beneficiary status because of  
21 administrative delays in visa processing or adjustment application adjudication.”  
22 Wang, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 31; accord Padash v. INS, 358 F.3d 1161, 1167 (9th Cir.  
23 2004).

24  
25 \_\_\_\_\_  
26 <sup>2</sup> For the preference categories, see 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(1)-(4).

27 <sup>3</sup> For immigration purposes, a “child” is defined as an unmarried individual under age  
28 twenty-one. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1).

1 Among other things, the CSPA amended § 203 of the INA by adding what is  
2 now subsection (h). This provision allows certain aliens to maintain the status of a  
3 child of a lawful resident alien for purposes of the 2A preference category even  
4 after turning twenty-one. Specifically, § 203(h) provides that an alien's age for  
5 purposes of the 2A category is to be determined by subtracting the time that the  
6 petition for classification was pending from the alien's age at the time that a visa  
7 number becomes available. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(h)(1)-(2); Baruelo v. Comfort, No. 05  
8 C 6659, 2006 WL 3883311, at \*3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 19, 2006). In addition, the statute  
9 provides that if the alien is determined to be twenty-one or older after applying this  
10 calculation, the "petition shall automatically be converted to the appropriate  
11 category and the alien shall retain the original priority date issued upon receipt of  
12 the original petition" – in other words, the date the original petition was filed. 8  
13 U.S.C. § 1153(h)(3); accord Padash, 358 F.3d at 1174.

14 Plaintiffs' complaint challenges Defendants' lack of a uniform policy  
15 implementing §203(h)(3), and seeks declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of  
16 members of a proposed class. In their motion, as amended,<sup>4</sup> Plaintiffs move to  
17 certify the following two subclasses:

18  
19 Individuals who a) have or will have obtained lawful permanent  
20 resident status as a result of being a primary beneficiary of a prior  
21 family or employment based visa petition or diversity immigrant visa  
22 application on or after August 6, 2002; b) are the parents of an adult  
23 child or children (sons and daughters) who are or were a derivative  
24 beneficiary of their prior family or employment based visa petition or  
25 diversity immigrant visa application; c) have or will have filed a

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26  
27 <sup>4</sup> For the motion to amend, see Docket No. 57.

1 subsequent family based immigrant visa petition(s) (Form I-130) for  
2 their adult child or children (sons and daughters) under the F2B  
3 category; and d) whose subsequent family based immigrant visa  
4 petition(s) (Form I-130) is entitled to the automatic retention of the  
5 original priority date of the petitioner's prior family or employment  
6 based visa petition or diversity immigrant visa application pursuant to  
7 INA § 203(h)(3).

8  
9 Individuals who a) are or were a derivative beneficiary of a family or  
10 employment based visa petition or diversity immigrant visa  
11 application where the primary beneficiary obtained or will obtain  
12 lawful permanent resident status on or after August 6, 2002; b) whose  
13 age is 21 years or older for the purposes of INA §§ 203(a)(2)(A) and  
14 (d) as determined under INA § 203(h)(1); c) whose family or  
15 employment based visa petition or diversity immigrant visa  
16 application is entitled to the automatic conversion to the F2B category  
17 and retention of the original priority date of the original family or  
18 employment based visa petition or diversity immigrant visa  
19 application pursuant to INA § 203(h)(3); and d) face future and/or  
20 ongoing separation from family members as a result of Defendants'  
21 failure to automatically convert the immigrant visa petition and retain  
22 the original visa petition priority date pursuant to INA § 203(h)(3).<sup>5</sup>

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23 <sup>5</sup> Costello amends the subclasses in her original motion to include, *inter alia*, references  
24 to diversity immigrant visa applications. (Compare Docket No. 53, with Docket No. 57.)  
25 Subsection (a) of 8 U.S.C. § 1153 provides a preference allocation for family-based visa  
26 petitions, subsection (b) for employment-based petitions, and subsection (c) for diversity  
27 immigrant visa applications.

1  
2 (Mot. Br. 2.) But the complaint defines the class as:

3  
4 All persons who have filed an immigrant visa petition(s) for their  
5 child or children with a request for the original priority date or are the  
6 derivative beneficiary of an immigrant visa petition who face future  
7 and/or ongoing separation from family members as a result of the  
8 Defendants [sic] failure to automatically convert and retain the  
9 original visa petition priority date pursuant to Section 3 of the Child  
10 Status Protection Act.

11 (Compl. ¶ 12, emphasis supplied.) The complaint also includes two subclasses:

12  
13 Parents who have filed an immigrant visa petition or are the adult  
14 children beneficiaries of an immigrant visa petition who face  
15 separation from each other as a result of the Defendants [sic] refusal  
16 to automatically convert and retain the original priority date of the  
17 original visa petition pursuant to Section 3 of the Child Status  
18 Protection Act.

19  
20 Parents who have filed an immigrant visa petition who face separation  
21 from their children as a result of the Defendants [sic] failure to act  
22 regarding the automatic conversion and retention of the original  
23 priority date of the original visa petition pursuant to Section 3 of the  
24 Child Status Protection Act.

25  
26 (Id. at 9-10.) The Court is bound to class definitions provided in the complaint  
27  
28

1 and, absent an amended complaint, will not consider certification beyond it.<sup>6</sup>

2  
3 Plaintiffs seek certification under Rule 23(a) and (b)(2). Before turning to  
4 this two-part analysis, however, the Court takes up the logic that caused it to stay  
5 this case in the first place – that the BIA should be afforded an opportunity to  
6 interpret § 203(h)(3).

7  
8 A. The BIA Cases

9  
10 As a preliminary matter, Defendants contend that judicial review of this  
11 motion should be denied, or further delayed, to the extent that administrative action  
12 by the BIA may preclude class certification or require additional review by this  
13 Court.

14  
15 The Court has already stayed this action for 180 days to afford the BIA an  
16 opportunity to interpret § 203(h)(3) – the central provision at issue here – in two

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17  
18  
19 <sup>6</sup> Berlowitz v. Nob Hill Masonic Mgmt., Inc., No. C-96-01241 MHP, 1996 WL 724776,  
20 at \*2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 1996) (rejecting plaintiff’s attempt to certify a class different from that  
21 alleged in the complaint, because the “court is bound by the class definition provided in the  
22 complaint . . . and will not consider certification of the class beyond the definition provided in  
23 the complaint unless plaintiffs choose to amend it”); see also Ortiz v. McNeil-PPC, Inc., Nos.  
24 07cv678-MMA(CAB), 08cv536-MMA(CAB), 2009 WL 1322962, at \*2 (S.D. Cal. May 8,  
25 2009); Stuart v. Radioshack Corp., No. C-07-4499 EMC, 2009 WL 281941, at \*2 (N.D. Cal.  
26 Feb. 5, 2009). But see Pop’s Pancakes, Inc. v. NuCO2, Inc., 251 F.R.D. 677, 680 n.1 (S.D. Fla.  
27 2008).

1 related cases pending before the BIA.<sup>7</sup> Notably, the BIA recently decided one of  
2 those cases. Based on its reading of § 203(h)(3) and the legislative history, the  
3 BIA in Wang held that the automatic conversion and priority date retention  
4 provisions did not apply to an alien who aged out of eligibility for an immigrant  
5 visa as the derivative beneficiary of a fourth-preference visa petition, and on whose  
6 behalf a second-preference petition was later filed by a different petitioner. 25 I. &  
7 N. Dec. at 38-39. Notwithstanding Defendants’ arguments in their supplemental  
8 brief, the BIA opinion in Wang does not make this case any less appropriate for  
9 class certification. To the contrary, it is persuasive authority on a question of law  
10 common to the putative class members. This point is neatly illustrated by  
11 Defendants themselves, who point out that Wang “specifically declined to follow  
12 Maria T. Garcia, an unpublished, nonprecedential decision often cited by  
13 Plaintiffs.”<sup>8</sup> (Supp’l Opp’n Br. 2.)

14 Accordingly, the Court does not find Wang a reason to delay further  
15 consideration of this motion, much less deny class certification.

17 As to the other case pending before the BIA, Defendants have apprised the  
18 Court of BIA correspondence, dated April 16, 2009, indicating that this “case[ is]

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19  
20 <sup>7</sup> The cases are Matter of Wang and In the matter of Patel: “Wang involves the aging-out  
21 of a derivative beneficiary of a family preference petition[;] Patel involves the aging-out of a  
22 derivative beneficiary of an employment preference petition.” (Opp’n Br. 22-23.)

23 <sup>8</sup> Defendants cite to Wang, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 33 n.2, citing Matter of Garcia, A79 001  
24 587, 2006 WL 2183654, at \* (B.I.A. June 16, 2006), which “agree[d] with the respondent that  
25 where [a child] was classified as a derivative beneficiary of the original petition, the ‘appropriate  
26 category’ for purposes of section 203(h)(3) is that which applies to the ‘aged-out’ derivative  
27 vis-a-vis the principal beneficiary of the original petition.”

1 under active consideration . . . and [a] decision[] may be expected soon.” (Docket  
2 No. 52, Ex. A.) With respect to this case, Defendants assert that the Court’s  
3 interpretation of § 203(h)(3) would be subject to immediate review as soon as the  
4 BIA’s decision is issued.

5  
6 To support this claim, Defendants vaguely allude to prudential exhaustion  
7 and the Chevron doctrine. (Opp’n Br. 6-7.) Prudential exhaustion counsels courts  
8 to exhaust administrative remedies; it is discretionary in this context,<sup>9</sup> and only  
9 applies where:

10  
11 (1) agency expertise makes agency consideration necessary to  
12 generate a proper record and reach a proper decision; (2) relaxation of  
13 the requirement would encourage the deliberate bypass of the  
14 administrative scheme; and (3) administrative review is likely to allow  
15 the agency to correct its own mistakes and to preclude the need for  
16 judicial review.

17 Gonzales v. DHS, 508 F.3d 1227, 1234 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks  
18 omitted). Here, none of these prerequisites are clearly implicated. Further  
19 guidance by the BIA, while helpful, is not necessary because the BIA has already  
20 provided a relevant interpretation of § 203(h)(3). The Ninth Circuit in Padash has  
21 also provided a general interpretation of § 203(h), as set forth in greater detail  
22 below. There is also nothing to suggest that Plaintiffs are attempting to bypass the  
23

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24 <sup>9</sup> To the extent that the BIA provides available remedies, the Ninth Circuit in Sun v.  
25 Ashcroft, observed that “a court is free to require exhaustion of such remedies – not because of  
26 any jurisdictional objection or statutory command but simply because it makes sense.” 370 F.3d  
27 932, 942 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).

1 BIA. The Court has afforded the BIA an opportunity to construe § 203(h)(3). The  
2 BIA has done so in Wang, which is more relevant to this case because, as here, it  
3 involves family-based petitions, as opposed to employment-based petitions.  
4 Moreover, despite recent assurances, there is no guarantee that the BIA will issue  
5 its opinion as to employment-based petitions any time soon, which in any event  
6 would be irrelevant to the class defined below. Previously, the Court expressed  
7 “sensitiv[ity] to Costelo’s concern that (1) the BIA may chose not to issue a written  
8 opinion on the pending § 203 cases; and (2) there is no time limit in which the BIA  
9 must rule on those cases, if ever.” (Docket No. 32, at 1.) Finally, there is no  
10 suggestion that the BIA has erred below and thus requires an allowance to correct  
11 its mistake; the BIA has simply failed to act as to the other § 203 case.

12  
13 In National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet  
14 Services, 545 U.S. 967, 983 (2005), cited by Defendants, the Supreme Court made  
15 the following observation in reference to the Chevron doctrine of administrative  
16 deference: “Only a judicial precedent holding that the statute unambiguously  
17 forecloses the agency’s interpretation, and therefore contains no gap for the agency  
18 to fill, displaces a conflicting agency construction.” On this basis, Defendants  
19 assert that the “added work and expense of litigating this issue twice on a class  
20 scale militates against class certification at this time.” (Opp’n Br. 7-8.) This  
21 argument lacks force now that the BIA has decided Wang.<sup>10</sup>

22 Although Wang is more directly on point, the Court may also benefit from  
23

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24 <sup>10</sup> Additionally, the Court agrees that Defendants’ reliance on “consular  
25 nonreviewability” is misplaced insofar as Plaintiffs seek to compel Defendants “to adopt  
26 uniform rules and policy in accordance with [] §203(h)(3) rather than reviewing individual  
27 decisions of consular officers.” (Reply Br. 5.)

1 the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of § 203(h) in a related case. In Padash, the  
2 Ninth Circuit explained that, under the CSPA, an individual eligible for permanent  
3 residence as a derivative beneficiary under 8 U.S.C. § 1153(d), who is over twenty-  
4 one years of age, may have his status adjusted provided that: (1) he was a “child”  
5 on the date upon which the immigrant visa became available for his parents, (2) he  
6 applied for adjustment of status within one year of availability, and (3) he aged-out  
7 while waiting for his application to be adjudicated. 358 F.3d at 1167 (citing 8  
8 U.S.C. § 1153(h)(1)(A)-(B)). While the circuit did not interpret § 203(h)(3),  
9 specifically, it did endorse a broad reading of CSPA, generally:

10 Congress had but one goal in passing the [CSPA] – to override the  
11 arbitrariness of statutory age-out provisions that resulted in young  
12 immigrants losing opportunities, to which they were entitled, because  
13 of administrative delays. Accordingly, adopting a restrictive reading  
14 of the statute in order to limit relief, would contravene Congress’s  
15 intent, and the purpose and objective of the law.

16  
17 Id. at 1174 (emphasis supplied). The circuit further observed that “Congress  
18 passed the Act to provide broad protection to young immigrants who were required  
19 to wait years for their approved visas to become available, only to have agency  
20 delays in processing their applications or petitions prevent them from obtaining  
21 permanent residence status,” and clarified that “Congress did not make the Act  
22 retroactive to all immigrants previously denied relief [but] only to those individuals  
23 whose cases had not yet been finally resolved, and thus only to those whose  
24 records were readily available to the agency.” Padash, 358 F.3d at 1174.

25  
26 At a minimum, Defendants seek to limit the scope of the class “to the Ninth  
27 Circuit in order to allow further development of this issue across the country.”

1 (Opp'n Br. 2; see also Supp'l Opp'n Br. 3-4.) Defendants cite Hootkins v.  
2 Chertoff, No. CV 07-5696 CAS (MANx), 2009 WL 57031, at \*4 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 6,  
3 2009), for the proposition that this Court should be "mindful of the importance of  
4 allowing the government to litigate legal issues before different courts throughout  
5 the country." But, unlike in Hootkins, the interest that other circuits have in  
6 litigating this general issue appears to be attenuated by the Wang decision, and by  
7 the fact that a number of other circuits have endorsed the Ninth Circuit's broad  
8 understanding of the CSPA in Padash, even within the past couple of months. E.g.,  
9 Midi v. Holder, 566 F.3d 132 (4th Cir. 2009); Calix-Chavarria v. Attorney General  
10 of U.S., 182 Fed. Appx. 72, 75 (3d Cir. 2006); Corea v. U.S. Attorney General, 170  
11 Fed. Appx. 700, 701 (11th Cir. 2006).

12  
13 Accordingly, the Court can divine no principled reason to limit the proposed  
14 class to the Ninth Circuit. For purposes of this action, a putative class member in  
15 New Mexico is not differently situated from one in California by virtue of the fact  
16 that the former resides in the Tenth Circuit and the latter in the Ninth Circuit. The  
17 Court therefore declines to limit the scope of the class in this manner.

18 B. Rule 23(a)

19  
20 With this background the Court now turns to the question of whether the  
21 proposed class satisfies all four of the Rule 23(a) requirements, i.e., numerosity,  
22 commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation.

23  
24 1. Numerosity

25  
26 Rule 23(a)(1) requires that the class be "so numerous that joinder of all  
27 members is impracticable." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). Here, Plaintiffs allege that

1 “the proposed class includes thousands.” (Mot. Br. 7.) Plaintiffs’ counsel claims  
2 to have at least 26 such cases, but offers no supporting evidence. (Id.) Nor do  
3 Plaintiffs offer any support for the claim that “a large portion of the attorneys” at a  
4 recent conference had encountered similar cases. (Id. at 8.) Such a claim is vague  
5 and, even where Plaintiffs offer greater precision, there is nothing to substantiate  
6 their claim about the number of visas issued each year, which in any event requires  
7 the Court to speculate as to the number of putative class members.<sup>11</sup> (Id.)

8  
9 Notwithstanding these shortcomings, Plaintiffs are not required “to state the  
10 exact number and identity of every class member because to do so would frustrate  
11 the purpose of class actions when recoveries may be numerous but small.” In re  
12 U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 69 F.R.D. 24, 34 (S.D. Cal. 1975) (citing Herbst v. Able, 278  
13 F. Supp. 664 (S.D.N.Y.1967)). “Where the exact size of the class is unknown but  
14 general knowledge and common sense indicate that it is large, the numerosity  
15 requirement is satisfied.” Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, 541 F. Supp. 351, 370  
16 (D.C. Cal. 1982). Defendants do not contest that numerosity is satisfied, and the  
17 Court finds that this requirement has been met.<sup>12</sup> E.g., Ark. Ed. Ass’n v. Bd. of Ed.  
18 of Portland, Ark. School Dist., 446 F.2d 763, 765 (8th Cir. 1971) (class of twenty

19 \_\_\_\_\_  
20 <sup>11</sup> However, the House Judiciary Committee reported that, due to administrative delays  
21 of up to three years before the passage of the CSPA, approximately one thousand of the visa  
22 applications reviewed each year were for individuals who had aged-out since the time they had  
23 filed their petitions. Padash, 358 F.3d at 1172-73 (citing 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. 640, 641).

24 <sup>12</sup> Factors relevant to the impracticability of joinder “include judicial economy arising  
25 from the avoidance of a multiplicity of actions, geographic dispersion of class members,  
26 financial resources of class members, the ability of claimants to institute individual suits, and  
27 requests for prospective injunctive relief which would involve future class members.” Robidoux  
28 v. Celani, 987 F.2d 931, 936 (2d Cir. 1993). These factors weigh in Plaintiffs’ favor.

1 black teachers in school district was sufficiently numerous).

2  
3 2. Commonality

4  
5 Rule 23(a)(2) requires that questions of law or fact be common to the class.  
6 This requirement is permissively construed. Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d  
7 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1998). “The existence of shared legal issues with divergent  
8 factual predicates is sufficient, as is a common core of salient facts coupled with  
9 disparate legal remedies within the class.” Id.

10  
11 “[T]ypicality and commonality are similar and tend to merge.” Dukes v.  
12 Wal-Mart, Inc., 509 F.3d 1168, 1184 (9th Cir. 2007). “Commonality examines the  
13 relationship of facts and legal issues to class members, while typicality focuses on  
14 the relationship of facts and issues between the class and its representatives.” Id. at  
15 n.12. Here, questions of law common to all class members include:

- 16
- 17 • Whether Defendants failed to adopt policies and procedures in  
18 accordance with § 203(h)(3);
  - 19 • Whether Defendants failed to promulgate a uniform policy to  
20 implement § 203(h)(3).
  - 21
  - 22 • Whether § 203(h)(3) preserves a parent’s original priority date for  
23 use by their unmarried sons and daughters who are twenty-one years  
24 of age or older;
  - 25
  - 26 • Whether Defendants’ challenged practices and policies violate §  
27 203(h)(3); and

- 1 • Whether Defendants’s failure to promulgate regulations  
2 implementing § 203(h)(3) violates the Administrative Procedure Act  
3 (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq., due process and equal protection  
4 under the Fifth Amendment, and §§ 1 and 3 of Article II.

5  
6 Most importantly, the underlying common question of law is whether the  
7 automatic conversion and date retention provisions of § 203(h)(3) apply to aliens  
8 who age out of eligibility for an immigrant visa as the derivative beneficiary of a  
9 third- or fourth-preference visa petition, and on whose behalf a second-preference  
10 petition is later filed by a different petitioner. This common question of law, and  
11 other ancillary questions, are sufficient to satisfy the permissive requirements of  
12 Rule 23(a). However, even if these questions of law are common to all class  
13 members, not all class members necessarily have standing to assert claims with  
14 respect to § 203(h)(3), as discussed below.

15 3. Typicality

16  
17 In examining typicality, the Court considers “whether other members have  
18 the same or similar injury, whether the action is based on conduct which is not  
19 unique to the named plaintiffs, and whether other class members have been injured  
20 by the same course of conduct.” Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 508  
21 (9th Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted). Like commonality, typicality is  
22 a “permissive” standard and “the focus should be on the defendants’ conduct and  
23 plaintiff’s legal theory, not the injury caused to the plaintiff.” Simpson v.  
24 Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 231 F.R.D. 391, 396 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (internal quotation  
25 marks omitted).

26  
27 Defendants challenge the proposed class as overbroad because, inter alia,

1 various subclasses lack standing. To establish standing, Plaintiffs must show  
2 injury, causation, and redressability. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.  
3 555, 560 (1992). It is undisputed that the named plaintiffs themselves have  
4 standing. Costelo became a lawful permanent resident on July 22, 2004 as a  
5 primary beneficiary of a third-preference visa petition filed by her mother on  
6 January 5, 1990. (Compl. ¶ 19.) She filed a second-preference petition for her two  
7 daughters on September 23, 2004, and alleges that Defendants denied one of her  
8 two daughters, a derivative beneficiary of the original petition, the retention of the  
9 January 5, 1990 priority date. (Id.) Ong became a lawful permanent resident on  
10 July 16, 2004 as a primary beneficiary of a fourth-preference visa petition filed by  
11 her sister on May 7, 1981. (Id. ¶ 20.) He filed a second-preference petition for his  
12 two daughters on March 8, 2005, and alleges that Defendants have failed to  
13 respond to his request to retain the May 7, 1981 priority date for his daughters,  
14 derivative beneficiaries of the original petition. (Id. ¶ 20.)

15 In evaluating the standing issue, which bears on typicality in this case, the  
16 Court looks to the language of 8 U.S.C. § 1153, upon which this action so heavily  
17 depends. The gravamen of this action is that the class has been injured by  
18 Defendants' failure to promulgate regulations implementing § 203(h)(3) so that a  
19 derivative beneficiary who has aged out of a third- or fourth-preference visa  
20 petition may automatically convert her status to that of a beneficiary of a second-  
21 preference category, and retain the priority date previously accorded to her as the  
22 derivative beneficiary of the original petition. Significantly, the second-preference  
23 category applies only to the children and unmarried sons and daughters of  
24 "permanent resident aliens," such as Plaintiffs. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(2).

25  
26 It is therefore reasonable to presume that Plaintiffs, as "permanent resident  
27 aliens," have standing to assert this entitlement. What is less clear, as Defendants  
28

1 point out, is whether the children of such aliens have standing as derivative  
2 beneficiaries. (Opp'n Br. 11, citing 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(a)(iii)(B), and various  
3 cases.)<sup>13</sup> Nor is it even clear whether immigrant parents who are not yet  
4 "permanent resident aliens" have standing. Moreover, Wang suggests that whether  
5 an alien obtains permanent residence through family-based visa petitions,  
6 employment-based petitions, or diversity immigrant applications may control the  
7 underlying legal issue here. See 25 I. & N. Dec. at 35 ("[T]he concept of  
8 'retention' of priority dates has always been limited to visa petitions filed by the  
9 same family member."). The Court finds Plaintiff's reply brief inadequate to  
10 address these concerns and, therefore, is unwilling to certify a broad class so long  
11 as doubt remains. Also, to the extent that Plaintiffs have the burden to show that  
12 their claims and defenses are typical to those of the proposed class, see Zinser v.  
13 Accufix Research Inst., Inc., 253 F.3d 1180, 1186 (9th Cir. 2001), the Court finds  
14 that the class is more properly limited to putative class members who, like  
15 Plaintiffs, became lawful permanent residents as primary beneficiaries of third- and  
16 fourth-preference visa petitions listing their children as derivative beneficiaries,  
17 and who subsequently filed second-preference petitions on behalf of their aged-out  
18 unmarried sons and daughters, for whom Defendants have not granted automatic  
19 conversion or the retention of priority dates pursuant to § 203(h)(3).

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21 <sup>13</sup> For example, Blacher v. Ridge, 436 F. Supp. 2d 602, 606 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), cites 8  
22 C.F.R. § 103.3(a)(iii)(B), which holds that, in the context of immigration appeals, "the person or  
23 entity with legal standing in a proceeding . . . does not include the beneficiary of a visa petition."  
24 See also Do Vale v. INS, No. 01-216-ML, 01-507-ML, 2002 WL 1455347, at \*5 (D.R.I. June  
25 25, 2002) ("While the denial of the family visa petition may have been prejudicial to Petitioner's  
26 wife, it was not prejudicial to the Petitioner [as the beneficiary of a family-based visa  
27 petition].").



1 C. Rule 23(b)(2)

2  
3 Plaintiffs seek certification of a class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2). A class may  
4 be certified under this subsection when “the party opposing the class has acted or  
5 refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive  
6 relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a  
7 whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). Defendants contend that certification under Rule  
8 23(b)(2) is not warranted where, as here, they have not refused to act on grounds  
9 generally applicable to putative class members, but in fact have acted by  
10 “certif[ying] this exact issue to the Board” in two cases related to the interpretation  
11 of § 203(h)(3). However, the question of whether Defendants have or have not  
12 failed to act is uniformly applicable to the class. Moreover, Defendants’ argument  
13 is misplaced to the extent Plaintiffs challenge “Defendants’ failure to promulgate  
14 regulations implementing CSPA benefits.” (Compl. ¶ 4.) On that claim, with  
15 respect to § 203(h)(3) in particular, Plaintiffs seeks injunctive and declaratory  
16 relief as well as costs and fees, but do not seek compensatory damages. (Compl. at  
17 32-33.)

18 Accordingly, certification is proper under Rule 23(b)(2).<sup>14</sup>

19  
20 IV. Conclusion

21 \_\_\_\_\_  
22 <sup>14</sup> Defendants do not make much of their argument that, “[i]f class litigation were to  
23 proceed at this time, the interests of those lawful permanent residents whose sons and daughters  
24 would be displaced under Plaintiffs’ reading of 8 U.S.C. § 1153(h)(3) must be evaluated to  
25 determine if they are necessary parties.” (Opp’n Br. 4 n.4.) This argument presupposes that the  
26 Court will confer new rights on Plaintiffs rather than enforce rights which they already had by  
27 virtue of congressional action.

1 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs' motion for class  
2 certification subject to certain revisions. The class is defined as: "Aliens who  
3 became lawful permanent residents as primary beneficiaries of third- and fourth-  
4 preference visa petitions listing their children as derivative beneficiaries, and who  
5 subsequently filed second-preference petitions on behalf of their aged-out  
6 unmarried sons and daughters, for whom Defendants have not granted automatic  
7 conversion or the retention of priority dates pursuant to § 203(h)(3)." The Court  
8 recognizes that the BIA has weighed in on this matter, but the underlying legal  
9 question is still subject to debate. It is not necessary for the Court to resolve the  
10 question at this time; for purposes of class certification, it is sufficient that the  
11 question is common to the class a whole.

12 The Court appoints the law firm of Reeves & Associates as lead class  
13 counsel.

14  
15 IT IS SO ORDERED.

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18  
19 DATED: July 16, 2009



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20 JAMES V. SELNA  
21 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE  
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