RETURN TO HOMEPAGE

 

In the united states court of appeals

for the ninth circuit

 

 

 

 

Benjamin CABRERA                )       

Londy CABRERA,                   )        Case No. ____________________________

                   Petitioners,            )

                                                )        INS Docket Nos. A75 710 964

                   v.                          )                                    A75 710 965

                                                )

John Ashcroft,                          )

Attorney General,                      )

Respondent           )

                                                          )

 

 

petition for review and motion for stay of removal and for stay of voluntary departure

Petitioners, Mr. Benjamin Cabrera and Mrs. Londy Cabrera, hereby petition this Court for review of the Final Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board), entered on September 22, 2003, vacating the Immigration Judge’s grant of their applications for cancellation of removal, and entering an order of voluntary departure with an alternate order of removal. Petitioners further request that the Court issue an Order staying their removal and staying their voluntary departure date.  This petition is timely filed pursuant to Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 242(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. §1252(b)(1) as it is filed within thirty (30) days of the final order of removal.  This petition is also filed before the expiration of the voluntary departure period.   

In support of their motion, Petitioners state through Counsel as follows:

 

JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction over these removal proceedings is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252.  This Court has jurisdiction to determine constitutional claims pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252; see also Jimenez-Angeles v. Ashcroft, 291 F.3d 594, 599 (9th Cir. 2002); Ramirez-Perez v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 1001, 1004 (9th Cir. 2003).  In addition, this Court retains jurisdiction to determine whether it has jurisdiction.  See, Murillo-Salmeron v. INS, 327 F.3d 898, 901 (9th Cir. 2003);  Hernandez v. Ashcroft, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 20364 (9th Cir. 2003).  Finally, this Court has equitable jurisdiction to stay a voluntary departure period.  El Himri v. Ashcroft, No. 03-71152, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 19430 (9th Cir. Sept. 19, 2003).   

 

VENUE

Venue is properly before this Court pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) because Mr. and Mrs. Cabrera reside in this jurisdiction, and the immigration judge completed proceedings Los Angeles, California.   

 

 

REQUEST FOR RELIEF

To obtain a Stay of Removal, a petitioner must show either 1) a probability of success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury, or 2) that serious legal questions are raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in petitioner’s favor.  Abbassi v. INS, 143 F.3d 513, 514 (9th Cir. 1998).  The standards for obtaining a Stay of Removal also apply to Stays of Voluntary Departure.  El Himri v. Ashcroft, No. 03-71152, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 19430, at p. 3 (9th Cir. Sept. 19, 2003).   

Ordinarily, the balance of hardships will weigh heavily in the applicant's favor.  Important factors include separation from family members, medical needs, and potential economic hardship. Andreiu v. Ashcroft, 253 F.3d 477, 484 (9th Cir. 2001).  

The balance of hardships in this case weighs sharply in favor of Mr. and Mrs. Cabrera   Denying their request for a stay of removal and voluntary departure would substantially harm Mr. and Mrs. Cabrera.  The couple has lived in the United States for ­approximately eighteen years, have two United States citizen daughters, and own their own home.  Mr. Cabrera’s mother and father are both lawful permanent residents of the United States.  Mrs. Cabrera’s mother and sister are lawful permanent residents, and her brother is a United States citizen.  Moreover, Mr. and Mrs. Cabrera are nationals of different countries - Mexico and Guatemala, respectively.  Thus, they are at risk of being separated not only from their daughters, but also from each other. 

This case involves important matters and raises serious legal issues concerning the authority of the Board in removal proceedings, as well as procedures of the Board, which if permitted to go unchecked will result in the denial of due process and fair application of the laws. 

Petitioners will demonstrate that the Board acted beyond the scope of their authority by making a decision contrary to law and denied them a full and fair hearing in violation of their due process rights. 

Granting their request for a stay of removal and voluntary departure would not substantially harm the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”), nor would it negatively affect the public interest.

For these reasons, Mr. and Mrs. Cabrera seek the protection of this Court and ask that the Court issue an Order granting a Stay of Removal and a Stay of Voluntary Departure during its consideration of the issues presented herein. 

 

Issues Presented

I.                           Whether the Board acted contrary to law by rendering a decision which failed to consider the hardship factors cumulatively.   

II.                        Whether the Board’s disregard of applicable case law denied Petitioner’s right to due process of law.    

 

FACTS

Benjamin Cabrera and Londy Hidalgo-Cabrera are a married couple.  Benjamin is a native and citizen of Mexico.  Londy is a native and citizen of Guatemala.  Both have lived in the United States since they were teenagers.  Benjamin first came to the United States in April of 1984, and Londy came to the United States on November 1, 1988.   

The former Immigration and Naturalization Service (“the Service”) issued Notices to Appear (“NTA”) to both, placing them in removal proceedings. Benjamin and Londy conceded removability and made applications for cancellation of removal before the Immigration Judge (“IJ”).  On March 29, 2002, the IJ granted their applications for cancellation of removal.  The Service appealed the IJ’s decision.  On September 22, 2003, the Board of Immigration Appeals (“Board”) vacated the IJ’s decision, finding that the diminution of educational opportunities that the Cabrera’s oldest child, Diana, would experience does not rise to the level of exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.  Board’s decision at 2. 

Benjamin and Londy have two (2) United States citizen children, Diana who is 11 years old, and Jocelyn who is 9 years old.  At their hearing before the IJ, extensive testimony was presented as to the gifted nature of both children.  Diana scored in the 99th percentile on her standardized tests, and has been accepted to a Johns Hopkins-sponsored summer program offering intensive instruction in math and science.  This program will last for four consecutive summers.  Jocelyn scored in the 75th percentile on her standardized tests.  As a result of her concern about her parents and the litigation, Jocelyn has experienced stress-related bladder control problems. 

Diana and Jocelyn have visited their parent’s birth countries only once, seven years ago.  The children accompanied their mother to Guatemala in 1995 for one month, a trip that Jocelyn doesn’t even remember.  Diana testified that on their return trip from Guatemala, they were in Tijuana for two days.  Both girls have been educated entirely in English. 

Benjamin and Londy come from two different countries, and would thus be removed to Mexico and Guatemala, respectively.  Diana testified about this situation at the hearing, explaining that her parent’s removal would be “very, very hard because I love my parents, and I wouldn’t like to be separated from them.”  Merit hearing, 03/29/02, p. 69.   

The family has a close relationship with their relatives here in the United States.  Londy has two U.S. citizen brothers, her mother is a lawful permanent resident, and all live nearby.  Benjamin’s parents are both lawful permanent residents living in Southern California.  He has nine brothers and sisters who also live in the area; two of his sisters have legal status.  

Benjamin helps to care for his mother, who is seriously ill with diabetes.  She stays with the family several days a week, and Benjamin supports her, along with his siblings.  After a surgery to amputate three toes, she stayed with Benjamin and Londy for three weeks during her recovery. 

Benjamin obtained a high school diploma in Mexico at age fifteen, but has no work experience in that country.  He has worked as a waiter for thirteen years.  Londy has only recently become employed as a teacher’s aide at her daughter’s school.  Previously, she worked in the home. 

 

ARGUMENTS

I.                  The Board acted contrary to law by rendering a decision which failed to consider the hardship factors cumulatively. 

On March 29, 2002, Mr. and Mrs. Cabrera were granted cancellation of removal in Los Angeles Immigration Court.  The Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) District Counsel appealed the Judge’s grant of cancellation to the Board.  On September 22, 2003, the Board vacated this decision stating that “diminished educational opportunities in the parents’ home country does not rise to a level of exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.”  Board’s decision, at 2.  This decision contradicts the Board’s own precedent decisions regarding cancellation of removal, which have consistently held that the relevant hardship factors are to be considered in the aggregate, or for their cumulative impact. Matter of Monreal, 23 I&N Dec. 56 (BIA 2001); Matter of Recinas, 23 I&N Dec 467 (BIA 2002).

Petitioners recognize that this Court is without jurisdiction to determine whether the requisite showing of hardship has been made, or whether the Board’s interpretation of the hardship standard is itself proper.  However, in interpreting IIRIRA’s jurisdictional limitations, restrictions on jurisdiction should be construed narrowly.  Hernandez v. Ashcroft, No. 02-70988, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 20364 at 18 (9th Cir. Oct. 7, 2003); citing Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999).  The provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1252 which stripped the federal courts of jurisdiction over discretionary decisions in the cancellation of removal context do not divest this court of the ability to determine that the Board acted beyond the scope of its authority and in contravention to applicable case law and regulations.

This Court recently determined that it retained jurisdiction to review a denial of an application for adjustment of status on discretionary grounds.  The Court said that the Board has no discretion to make a decision which is contrary to the law.  Because the denial was made in reliance on an impermissible basis, this Court looked beyond the discretionary label, and stated that “a nonprecedential decision by the BIA in defiance of its own precedential case law simply cannot be classified as discretionary.”  Hernandez v. Ashcroft, No. 02-70988, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 20364, at 18-20 (9th Cir. Oct. 7, 2003). 

The Court went on to explain that:

The regulations themselves limit the BIA’s discretion to operating within the law…We emphasize that we are not applying an abuse of discretion standard; if a decision is not within the power of the BIA, it cannot be construed as discretionary…As we have explained before, “[t]he BIA must exercise its discretion ‘within the constraints of law.’” …When the BIA acts where it has no legal authority to do so, it does not make a discretionary decision…and such a determination is not protected from judicial review.  Hernandez, at 20-21, (internal citations omitted).

To date, the Board has issued three precedent decisions regarding cancellation of removal.  Those decisions are Matter of Monreal, 23 I&N Dec. 56 (BIA 2001), Matter of Andazola, 23 I&N Dec 319 (BIA 2002), and Matter of Recinas, 23 I&N Dec 467 (BIA 2002).  The Board has held that in analyzing the hardship that removal would cause to the qualifying relative, consideration should be given to the following:

1)     Age,

2)     Health, and

3)     Circumstances of the qualifying family members, including how a lower standard of living or adverse country conditions in the country of return might affect those relatives.  Monreal, at 20. 

Moreover, the Board has additionally emphasized that the hardship factors should be considered in the aggregate.  In Monreal, the Board explained that, “…all hardship factors should be considered in the aggregate when assessing exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.”  Monreal, at 22.   This directive was confirmed in Recinas, which relied on the decisions of Monreal and Andazola and stated that, “Part of [the hardship] analysis requires the assessment of hardship factors in their totality, often termed a ‘cumulative’ analysis.”  Recinas, at 15 (emphasis added).  In Recinas, the Board found the requisite level of hardship had been met after explicitly considering the cumulative impact of the hardship factors presented in that particular case. 

Despite this clear mandate, only one factor was considered by the Board in this case.  The Board’s decision focused exclusively on the educational achievements of the Cabrera’s eldest daughter, Diana.  Diana is a gifted student who has was awarded a scholarship to attend a special four-year program sponsored by Johns Hopkins University.  In assessing the hardship to Diana should her parents be forced to leave the U.S., the Board simply utilizes the following boilerplate language:

We have held that the fact that educational opportunities for a child are better in the United States than in an alien’s homeland does not satisfy the extreme hardship standard relevant to suspension of deportation let alone the higher exceptional and extremely unusual hardship standard applicable to cancellation of removal…[We have noted] that to equate diminished educational opportunities with exceptional and extremely unusual hardship would result in the grant of cancellation of removal to virtually all cases involving respondents from developing countries with qualifying small children.  Board’s decision, at p. 2 (citations omitted). 

This analysis does not acknowledge the extraordinary nature of Diana’s educational achievements.

Furthermore, it is clear that the Board failed to consider the numerous additional factors presented in this case:

1.     Diana and Jocelyn’s parents will be removed to separate countries, thus they will not only have to leave their home country, but they may also be separated from at least one of their parents; 

2.     Diana and Jocelyn have a close relationship to their grandparents, aunts and uncles who reside lawfully in the United States, a factor which has been considered significant in prior BIA precedent decision regarding cancellation of removal;

3.     The hardship that the three lawful permanent resident parents of Benjamin and Londy would suffer if they were separated from both their children and grandchildren for an indefinite period of time;

4.     Jocelyn has experienced anxiety regarding her parent’s situation resulting in a recurrent loss of bladder control[1];

5.     Benjamin and Londy provide care for his lawful permanent resident mother who suffers from diabetes and has undergone surgery for this condition;

6.     Diana and Jocelyn have visited Guatemala and Mexico only once, and very briefly, almost eight years ago.  They have been educated entirely in English;

7.     The impact that conditions in Mexico and Guatemala would have on both girls, as substantiated by numerous documents regarding both countries. 

Most of these additional factors were explicitly considered by the IJ, and formed part of his well-reasoned and thorough decision to grant Benjamin and Londy cancellation of removal.  The Board’s own precedent decisions require that they consider these factors as well.   

 

II.               The Board’s disregard of applicable case law denied Petitioners’ right to due process of law.    

The Fifth Amendment guarantees due process of law in deportation proceedings.  Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993); See also, Campos-Sanchez v. INS, 164 F.3d 448, 450 (9th Cir. 1999).  Due process violations must be “colorable”.  To be colorable in this context, the alleged violation need not be “substantial,” but the claim must have some possible validity.   See, Torres-Aguilar v. INS, 246 F.3d 1267, 1270 (9th Cir. 2001); See also, Ortiz v. INS, 179 F.3d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 1999); Perez-Lastor v. INS, 208 F.3d 773, 780 (9th Cir. 2000).

Recently, this Court stated that “if the BIA interpreted ‘exceptional and extremely unusual hardship’ to mean that no hardship showing would ever be sufficient, its interpretation would be so divorced from Congress’ mandate as to violate the Constitution.  Ramirez-Perez v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 1001, 1005 (9th Cir. 2003).  In fact, by refusing to consider hardship factors in their aggregate, the Board can effectively eliminate the relief of cancellation of removal entirely.  In Recinas, the Board stated that, “the hardship standard is not so restrictive that only a handful of applicants, such as those who have a qualifying relative with a serious medical condition, will qualify for relief.”  Recinas, supra at 9.  Yet only a handful of applicants would be able to establish the requisite hardship on the basis of one factor alone.  

As a predicate to obtaining relief for a violation of procedural due process rights in immigration proceedings, a non-citizen must show that the violation caused prejudice to his or her case.  This standard is met under circumstances in which an alien’s rights are violated in such a way as to affect potentially the outcome of their deportation proceedings.  United States v. Cerda-Pena, 799 F.2d 1374, 1379 (9th Cir. 1986).  In assessing prejudice in this context, the Court does not need to determine with certainty whether the outcome would have been different, but rather must decide whether the violation potentially affected the outcome of the proceedings.  Ramirez-Alejandre v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 858, 872 (9th Cir. 2003).  Stated differently, a petitioner “must only show that he had a ‘plausible’ ground for relief from deportation.”  U.S. v. Ubaldo-Figueroa, No. 01-50376, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 21026, at 19 (9th Cir. Oct. 17, 2003), citing U.S. v. Arrieta, 224 F.3d 1076, 1080 (9th Cir. 2000).   

It is clear that Mr. and Mrs. Cabrera were prejudiced by the Board’s actions.  The Board’s reversal of the Judge’s decision deprives them of the opportunity to live and work in the U.S. and remain together with their family.  Moreover, an analysis of prejudice on the facts presented does not require the Court to determine whether the hardship standard has been met.  When the Board fails to adhere to case precedent, the outcome of the proceedings are at least potentially affected.  On the facts presented in this petition, the failure to assess all the hardship factors in the aggregate essentially eliminated the Cabreras’ chance of establishing the requisite hardship to qualify for cancellation of removal.

 

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we respectfully request that this Court grant Mr. and Mrs. Cabrera’s petition for review.  Furthermore, because this petition raises serious legal issues, and because the balance of hardships tips sharply in their favor, petitioners request this Court order a Stay of Removal and Stay of the Voluntary Departure period. 

Respectfully submitted,

________________________

Carl Shusterman

Law Offices of Carl Shusterman

Attorneys for Petitioners

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Certificate of Compliance

Pursuant to Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure (FRAP) 32(e)(4), the undersigned submits this Certificate of Compliance.  The attached “Petition for Review, and Motion for Stay of Removal and for Stay of Voluntary Departure” is double spaced pursuant to FRAP 32(b), and has a typeface of Times New Roman, point size 14, and is a total of ___ pages.

Dated:                                                          _____________________________

                                                                   Carl Shusterman

                                                                   Law Offices of Carl Shusterman

                                                                   Attorneys for Petitioners

                                                                   600 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 1550

                                                                   Los Angeles, CA 90017

                                                                   Tel. (213) 623 – 4592

 

Statement of Related Cases

Pursuant to Ninth Circuit Rule 28 – 2.6, counsel for the Petitioners is not aware of any related cases currently pending before the Court.

 

          Dated:                                                __________________________

Carl Shusterman

                                                                   Law Offices of Carl Shusterman

                                                                   Attorneys for Petitioners

                                                                   600 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 1550

                                                                   Los Angeles, CA 90017

                                                                   Tel. (213) 623 - 4592

 

Certificate of service

I hereby certify that on this day of October 20, 2003, two copies of the “Petition for Review and Motion for Stay of Removal and for Stay of Voluntary Departure” and all attachments thereto were served upon Counsel for the Respondent, by placing it in a United States mailbox, first class postage paid, addressed to:

 

John Ashcroft

Attorney General

U.S. Department of Justice

950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW

Washington, DC 20530-0001

 

Office of Immigration Litigation

Civil Division

P.O. Box 878, Ben Franklin Station

Washington, DC 20044

 

Dated:                                                __________________________

                                                          Carl Shusterman

                                                          Law Offices of Carl Shusterman

                                                          Attorney for Petitioners

600 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 1550

                                                          Los Angeles, CA 90017

                                                          Tel. (213) 623 - 4592



[1] In fact, the panel’s decision essentially overlooks Jocelyn altogether.  The single reference to Jocelyn’s existence is at the end of the panel’s decision, where they state that, “while we recognize that the respondent’s children will suffer some hardship resulting from their parent’s removal, we find that it does not rise to the level of exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.”  Board’s decision, at 2 (emphasis added).  Obviously, the panel failed to meaningfully  analyze the hardship that Jocelyn may experience if her parents are removed from the U.S.