RETURN TO HOMEPAGE

Carl Shusterman                                                                                   NOT DETAINED

LAW OFFICES OF CARL SHUSTERMAN

One Wilshire Building

600 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 1550

Los Angeles, California 90017

Tel. (213) 623-4592

 

 

 

 

 

                                    UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

                                                    DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

                                            BOARD OF IMMIGRATION REVIEW

 

 

 

In the matter of:

                                                         

)

Benjamin CABRERA                                    )           File No. A75 710 964

                                                                        )                         A75 710 965

Londy CABRERA                                         )

)

Removal Proceedings                                    )

                                                            ______)

 

 

 

 

RESPONDENTS’ MOTION TO RECONSIDER

MOTION FOR SUA SPONTE EN BANC REVIEW

AND MOTION FOR STAY OF REMOVAL


In accordance with 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b), this Motion to Reconsider is filed within thirty days of the Board’s decision dated September 22, 2003, and is based on the clear error of law in the Board’s decision. 

Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(5), the Board may on its own motion or by a majority vote of Board members consider any case en banc.  The regulations explain that en banc proceedings are appropriate where necessary to maintain consistency of Board’s decisions.  Because the Board’s decision in this case is in direct conflict with established precedent, Respondents request that this motion to reconsider be reviewed en banc. 

Respondents request a Stay of Removal pursuant to 8 C.F.R. §1003.2(f), which provides the Board with authority to grant a Stay pending resolution of a case.

 

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The respondents, Mr. Benjamin Cabrera (“Benjamin”) and Ms. Londy Hidalgo-Cabrera (“Londy”), are a married couple.  Tr. 13.  Benjamin is a native and citizen of Mexico. Tr. 36.  Londy is a native and citizen of Guatemala.  Tr. 12.   Both are 34 years old and have resided continuously in the U.S. since they were teenagers.  Tr. 11, 35.   Benjamin first arrived in the United States in April 1984, and Londy arrived on November 1, 1988.  Tr. 12, 35-36. 

The former Immigration and Naturalization Service (“the Service”) issued Notices to Appear (“NTA”) to both, placing them in removal proceedings.  Both Benjamin and Londy conceded removability and made applications for cancellation of removal before the Immigration Judge (“IJ”).  On March 29, 2002 the Judge granted their applications for cancellation of removal.  The Service appealed the Judge’s decision.  On September 22, 2003, the Board of Immigration Appeals (“Board”) vacated the IJ’s decision, finding that the diminution of educational opportunities that the Cabrera’s children would experience does not rise to the level of exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. 

Benjamin and Londy have two (2) United States citizen children: Diana who is 11 years old, and Jocelyn who is 9 years old.  At the hearing, there was extensive testimony as to the gifted nature of both children.  Diana scored in the 99th percentile on her standardized tests, and has been awarded a scholarship to a summer program for gifted students sponsored by Johns Hopkins University offering intensive instruction in mathematics and science.  Tr. 58.  This program will last for four years.  Jocelyn, scored in the 75th percentile on her standardized tests.  Tr. 58.  As a result of her concern about her parents’ current situation, Jocelyn is experiencing stress-related bladder control problems.  Tr. 58-59. 

Diana and Jocelyn have visited their parent’s birth countries only once, seven years ago.  The children accompanied their mother to Guatemala in 1995 for one month, a trip that Jocelyn doesn’t even remember.  Tr. 27.  Diana testified that on their return trip from Guatemala, they were in Tijuana for two days.  Tr. 67.  Both girls have been educated entirely in English.  Tr. 69. 

Benjamin and Londy are citizens of two different countries, and would thus be removed to Mexico and Guatemala, respectively.  Diana testified about this situation at the hearing, explaining that her parent’s removal would be “very, very hard because I love my parents, and I wouldn’t like to be separated from them.”  Id.

The family has a close relationship with their relatives here in the United States.  Tr. 16.  Londy has two U.S. citizen brothers, her mother is a lawful permanent resident, and all live nearby.  Tr.  15.   Benjamin’s parents are both lawful permanent residents living in Southern California.  Tr. 38.  He has nine brothers and sisters who also live in the area; two of his sisters have legal status.  Id.  

Benjamin helps to care for his mother, who has serious problems with diabetes.  Tr. 39.  She stays with the family several days a week, and Benjamin supports her, along with his siblings.  Tr. 37, 39.  After a surgery to amputate three toes, she stayed with Benjamin and Londy for three weeks during her recovery.  Tr. 40. 

Benjamin obtained a high school diploma in Mexico at age fifteen, but has no work experience in that country.  Tr. 44, 53.  He has worked as a waiter for thirteen years.  Tr. 44.  Londy is employed as a teacher’s aide at her daughter’s school.  Previously, she worked in the home.  Tr. 20. 

 

ISSUE

Whether The Board Followed Its Precedent Decisions Holding That All Relevant Factors Must Be Considered In The Aggregate In Deciding Whether The Hardship Standard Has Been Met. 

 

ARGUMENT

To date, the Board has issued three precedent decisions regarding cancellation of removal for nonpermanent residents.  Those decisions are Matter of Monreal, 23 I&N Dec. 56 (BIA 2001), Matter of Andazola, 23 I&N Dec 319 (BIA 2002), and Matter of Recinas, 23 I&N Dec 467 (BIA 2002).  The Board has held that in analyzing the hardship that removal would cause to the qualifying relative, consideration should be given to the following:

1)      Age,

2)      Health, and

3)      Circumstances of the qualifying family members, including how a lower standard of living or adverse country conditions in the country of return might affect those relatives.  Monreal, at 20. 

Moreover, the Board has emphasized that the hardship factors must be considered in the aggregate.  In Monreal, the Board explained that, “…all hardship factors should be considered in the aggregate when assessing exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.”  Monreal, at 22.   This directive was confirmed in Recinas, which relied on the decisions of Monreal and Andazola and stated that, “Part of [the hardship] analysis requires the assessment of hardship factors in their totality, often termed a ‘cumulative’ analysis.”  Recinas, at 15 (emphasis added).  In Recinas, the Board found the requisite level of hardship had been met after explicitly considering the cumulative impact of the hardship factors presented. 

The Ninth Circuit has held that the Board exceeds its authority when it acts in contrary to its own precedent case law[1].  Hernandez v. Ashcroft, No. 02-70988, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 20364, at 18-20 (9th Cir. Oct. 7, 2003).  The court stated that “a nonprecedential decision by the BIA in defiance of its own precedential case law simply cannot be classified as discretionary.”    In Hernandez, the Court determined that it retained jurisdiction to review a denial of an application for adjustment of status on discretionary grounds.  Despite the language of IIRIRA, which stripped the federal courts of jurisdiction to review a discretionary decision under INA § 245, the court said that the Board has no discretion to make a decision which is contrary to the law.  Because the denial was made in reliance on an impermissible basis, the court looked beyond the discretionary label and found jurisdiction.  The Court explained that:

The regulations themselves limit the BIA’s discretion to operating within the law… As we have explained before, “[t]he BIA must exercise its discretion ‘within the constraints of law.’” …When the BIA acts where it has no legal authority to do so, it does not make a discretionary decision…and such a determination is not protected from judicial review.  Hernandez, at 20-21, (internal citations omitted).

In the Cabrera’s case, despite the clear mandate of the Board’s own precedent decisions to consider the hardship factors “cumulatively”, only one hardship factor to one qualifying relative was considered.  The panel’s decision focused exclusively on the educational achievements of the Cabrera’s eldest daughter, Diana.  The Board’s decision states that:

We have held that the fact that educational opportunities for a child are better in the United States than in an alien’s homeland does not satisfy the extreme hardship standard relevant to suspension of deportation let alone the higher exceptional and extremely unusual hardship standard applicable to cancellation of removal…[We have noted] that to equate diminished educational opportunities with exceptional and extremely unusual hardship would result in the grant of cancellation of removal to virtually all cases involving respondents from developing countries with qualifying small children.  Board’s decision, at p. 2 (citations omitted). 

It is clear that the panel failed to consider the numerous additional factors presented in this case:

1.      Diana and Jocelyn’s parents will be removed to separate countries, thus the girls will not only have to leave their home country, but they may also be separated from one of their parents; 

2.      Diana and Jocelyn have a close relationship to their grandparents, aunts, uncles and cousins who reside lawfully in the United States, a factor which has been considered significant in a prior precedent decision regarding cancellation of removal[2];

3.      Jocelyn has experienced anxiety regarding her parent’s situation resulting in a recurrent loss of bladder control[3];

4.      Benjamin and Londy provide care for Benjamin’s lawful permanent resident mother who suffers from diabetes;

5.      Both of Londy’s parents and Benjamin’s mother, all of whom are lawful permanent residents, would face indefinite separation from their children and grandchildren;

6.      Diana and Jocelyn have visited Guatemala and Mexico only once, and very briefly, almost eight years ago.  They have been educated entirely in English;

7.      The impact that conditions in Mexico and Guatemala would have on both girls, as substantiated by numerous documents regarding both countries. 

Most of these additional factors were explicitly considered by the IJ, and formed part of his well-reasoned and thorough decision to grant Benjamin and Londy cancellation of removal.  The IJ’s decision was consistent with the Board’s precedent cases regarding cancellation of removal.  In Monreal, the Board reasoned that “[a] strong applicant might have a qualifying child with very serious health issues, or compelling special needs in school.”  Monreal, at 22.  When, as in this case, the special needs in school combine with numerous other compelling circumstances, the result is in fact a very uncommon situation where cancellation of removal is merited. 

The panel’s decision in this case mischaracterized the educational issue as involving merely a lessening of educational opportunities.  However, it is not simply that educational opportunities are less in Mexico or Guatemala, but rather that on the basis of Diana’s achievements and test scores, she has been accepted (and given a scholarship) to the Johns Hopkins program for a minimum of four summers.  If forced to leave the United States, she will be forced to abandon this opportunity.  In addition, the promise that Jocelyn now shows will be compromised, especially in light of her emotional and psychological sensitivities. 

Thus, the panel’s reliance on Matter of Ige, 20 I & N Dec. 880, 883 (BIA 1994) and Matter of Kim, 15 I & N Dec. 88 (BIA 1974) is misplaced.  In both cases the respondents failed to meet the former “extreme hardship standard” for suspension of deportation.  In Ige, the respondent presented a letter from his son’s first grade teacher “praising his academic and social adjustment” in support of his hardship claim.  In Matter of Kim, the respondents made “several general statements…to the effect that their children would have better economic and educational opportunities in the U.S. than in Korea.  15 I & N Dec. at 89.  These cases cannot reasonably be compared to the numerous facts in support of hardship presented by the Cabreras.        

The IJ did not base his decision on the lack of comparable educational opportunities alone.  Rather, he stated that:

The documentary evidence of record, the testimony of Diana’s principal, the information on country conditions...the representations of Diana herself, clearly reveal that Diana’s removal from the United States, or her separation from her parents in the United States, would cause severe damage to her present and future educational prospects, and to the support system which has enabled her to excel in a truly exceptional fashion.  Oral decision of the Judge, p. 13.   

Furthermore, the facts presented in this case are not typical or common.  Diana and Jocelyn’s educational needs are exceptional.  Diana in particular has tested in the 99th percentile on her standardized exams.  Their parents come from two separate countries, a fact over-looked by the Board, but not the IJ who stated that “the respondents face removal but not together to the same nation.”  Oral decision of the IJ at 6.  Jocelyn’s stress-related problems indicate that she is extremely vulnerable to further emotional and psychological harm which her parent’s removal would surely cause.  

By failing to consider all existing hardship factors in the aggregate, the Board can  effectively eliminate the relief of cancellation of removal altogether.  To quote the panel in their decision, “Such was not the intent of Congress.”  Board’s decision, at p. 2.  In Recinas, the Board stated that “the exceptional and extremely unusual hardship standard is not so restrictive that only a handful of applicants will qualify for relief.”  Recinas, at 9.  Yet “only a handful of applicants” would be able to establish the requisite hardship on the basis of one factor alone.  

Conclusion

            In light of the above, we respectfully request that the Board reconsider its decision. We also believe that the Board should grant sua sponte review this case en banc. The respondents request that all the factors in their case be considered cumulatively pursuant to this Board’s legal precedent.  Respondents are entitled to a full and fair hearing and a proper assessment of their hardship factors in their totality.  Respondents additionally request a stay of removal pending resolution of this case. 

 

 

Dated: October 20, 2003                                             Respectfully submitted:

 

 

_______________________

Carl Shusterman

The Law Offices of Carl Shusterman

                                                                                    Attorneys for the Respondents

 

 

 

 

 

 

In the Matter of

Benjamin Cabrera, A75 710 964

Londy Hidalgo Cabrera, A75 710 965

 

 

 

PROOF OF SERVICE

 

 

 

On October 20, 2003, I, Carl Shusterman, mailed or delivered a copy of this Motion to Reconsider, for Sua Sponte En Banc Review, and Stay of Removal, and any attached pages to An Mai Nguyen at the following address:

Office of the District Counsel

606 South Olive Street, 8th Floor

Los Angeles, CA 90014

 

via First Class Mail.

 

 

 

 

                                                            Signed: ­­­­­­­­______________________

                                                            Carl Shusterman

                                                            The Law Offices of Carl Shusterman

                                                              600 Wilshire Blvd.

                                                            Suite 1550

                                                            Los Angeles, CA 90017

                                                            (213) 623-4592

 

 

Dated: October 20, 2003

 



[1] It should be noted that Respondents have also filed a Petition for Review with the United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. 

[2] In Matter of Recinas, the Board explained that:

Unlike the situation in Monreal and Andazola, all of the respondent's family, including her siblings, reside lawfully in the United States. We find this significant because they are unlikely to be subject to immigration enforcement and will probably remain in the United States indefinitely…” Matter of Recinas, at p. 12-13. 

[3] In fact, the panel’s decision essentially overlooks Jocelyn altogether.  The single reference to Jocelyn’s existence is at the end of the panel’s decision, where they state that, “while we recognize that the respondent’s children will suffer some hardship resulting from their parent’s removal, we find that it does not rise to the level of exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.”  Board’s decision, at 2 (emphasis added).  Obviously, the panel failed to analyze the hardships that Jocelyn would experience if her parents were forced to leave the United States.